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FEDERALIST SOCIETY
CORPORATIONS: REGULATORY DOUBLE-DIPPING
JUDGE SMITH: Good morning. I’m Jerry Smith, a judge in the Circuit Court of
Appeals. It’s my privilege to moderate today’s panel discussion entitled “Regulatory
Double-Dipping,” a panel sponsored by the Federalist Society’s Corporations,
Antitrust, and Securities Practice Group. I’ll introduce our distinguished panelists in
just a minute.
First, just a moment of discussion on what we’ll be covering today. In a
world of globalization, whether we like it or not, businesses and individuals operate
in a regional and international environment. Once able to operate exclusively under
a single locally imposed regulatory regime, they must now comply oftentimes not
only with that regime but must also comply with a statewide regime, a national
regime, and an international regime of regulation. Of course, there are typically 50
statewide regimes, often more than one national regime with competing agencies,
and predictably several international regulatory regimes as well.
In this environment, individuals and businesses are in the first instance faced
with the challenge of determining who is regulating their proposed activity. Once
those regulators are identified, only then can individuals and corporations begin the
labor-intensive and time-consuming process of sorting through the applicable
treatises, laws, regulations, guidelines, et cetera, to which they’re subject. It’s become
a very complicated world with multiple layers of regulation and enforcement and, I
might add, permanent employment for lots of attorneys.
So, what is the effect of these multiple layers of regulation on businesses?
Does or should the answer differ from one field to the next—from antitrust, to
securities regulation, to labor issues? Do these multiple layers of regulation result in
what we might call a race to the bottom, whereby the most restrictive regulatory
regime, for all practical purposes, becomes the one that’s effective? If so, does that
create an incentive for over-regulation? And are there some helpful principles that
can be illuminated to try to resolve this situation? These and other questions will be
addressed by our distinguished group of panelists, whom I will now introduce to you
briefly in the order in which they’ll appear.
Paul Atkins was appointed by President George W. Bush to be
Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2002, with a term
expiring in 2008. Commissioner Atkins’ twenty-two year career has focused on the
financial services industry in securities regulation. Before his appointment as
Commissioner he assisted financial services firms in improving their compliance with
SEC regulations and worked with law enforcement agencies to investigate and rectify
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situations where investors had been harmed. He began his career in New York,
focusing on a wide range of corporate transactions for U.S. and foreign clients,
including public and private securities offerings and mergers and acquisitions. He’s a
member of the New York and Florida Bar, received his J.D. from Vanderbilt, and
was a senior student writing editor of the Vanderbilt Law Review. He received his A.B.
from Wofford College and was a member of Phi Beta Kappa.
Deborah Majoras is Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. She was
sworn in in 2004, and her tenure has been marked by strong efforts to protect
consumers from emerging frauds such as identity theft, spyware, and spam, with
increased focus on businesses’ failure to implement adequate information security
safeguards. In May 2006, she was appointed by the President to be Co-Chair of the
Federal Identity Theft Taskforce. She joined the FTC after having been with the
Jones Day firm here in Washington, where she served as a partner in the firm’s
antitrust section and worked on a variety of antitrust counseling in civil and criminal
litigation matters. In 2001, she was appointed Deputy Assistant Attorney General in
the Antitrust Division and was named Principal Deputy in 2002. She’s a graduate of
Westminster College in Pennsylvania and of the University of Virginia Law School.
Eugene Scalia is a partner in the D.C. office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher,
Co-Chair of the firm’s labor and employment practice group, and Chair of the
administrative law and regulatory practice group. He’s a member of the firm’s
appellate and constitutional law practice group. He returned to Gibson Dunn in
2003 after a distinguished service as Solicitor of the U.S. Department of Labor.
Matters for which he had substantial responsibility there included investigation of the
Enron pension plans, amendment of the white collar overtime regulations, and
implementation of the whistleblower provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley. At Gibson
Dunn, Mr. Scalia has a national labor and employment practice, and he’s a leading
authority on Sarbanes-Oxley. He’s a graduate of the University of Chicago Law
School, where he was editor-in-chief, and got his undergraduate degree from the
University of Virginia.
Finally, Michael Greve is the John G. Searle Scholar at the American
Enterprise Institute in Washington, where he directs the AEI Federalism Project.
His research and writing cover American federalism in its legal, political, and
economic dimensions. He earned his Ph.D. in government from Cornell and cofounded and directed the Center for Individual Rights. From 1989 to 2000, he
served on the board of directors of the Competitive Enterprise Institute. He has
written extensively on federalism and other aspects of American law. Dr. Greve’s
current project is a book on the constitutional foundations of competitive
federalism.
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It’s my privilege to begin with Paul Atkins.
COMMISSIONER ATKINS: Thank you, Judge Smith, for that kind introduction.
It’s a pleasure to be here today to talk about this topic.
Globalization, of course, is an inescapable reality. As Judge Smith said, there
are many causes: trade, better communications, the whole IT revolution, competition
for investment, and the ending of exchange controls and many foreign ownership
restrictions in the past couple of decades. Of course, too, the collapse of the Berlin
Wall and the opening of China have all contributed to the globalization boom as
well.
John Donne, a 17th century poet, wrote the famous Meditation XVII, that
says, “No man is an island, entire of itself. Every man is a piece of the continent, a
part of the main.” That’s an increasing realization around the world—not the least
in Britain itself—among regulators, certainly. We’ve seen an international backlash
against parts of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, even though many countries have adopted
large parts of the Act. Public securities markets are now looking abroad for merger
partners. The New York Stock Exchange has demutualized and will team up with
Euronext through an acquisition which will be voted on next month, and NASDAQ
is looking to acquire the London Stock Exchange.
The SEC experienced the ill-fated hedge fund rule, which required
registration of hedge funds, only to see that encourage domestic hedge funds to flee
abroad and foreign hedge funds to close themselves to U.S. investors to keep
regulation away. Next month, the SEC will consider finalization of a long-standing
proposal to make it easier for foreign companies to deregister from the United
States. I think that might well operate in the future as a sort of safety valve. When
regulations become too burdensome, we might see a flight of foreign companies
abroad, and that might tell us when we have twisted the buttons a little bit too
tightly.
In Europe, there is a similar sort of recognition that barriers to free
movement of capital are problematic. There have been, over the past 15 to 20 years,
moves to reduce barriers to competition in their own internal market. They have a
number of different proposals outstanding, which will kick in next year.
Last, but not least, the United States needs to recognize International
Financial Reporting Standards. It needs to recognize that U.S. GAAP is no longer
the only game in town. If we don’t recognize IFRS eventually (our goal is 2009), we
may well find that we will have a trade war between the U.S. and Europe, with
respect to our accounting standards. Europeans are a bit chafed that we don’t
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recognize their standards and instead require companies to follow U.S. GAAP
standards, even though they believe that IFRS has become a robust set of accounting
principles.
The response to these challenges has been a call for increased harmonization.
Compare the situation in the securities regulatory sphere to, say, the tax sphere,
where you have the pariah status of various tax havens and the pressure on other
low-tax regimes to conform. Even in Europe itself, some European politicians
comment that jurisdictions like Ireland, for example, which have lower taxes than
others, should harmonize their tax rates. In the securities regulatory world, we see
similar comments. The International Organization of Securities Commissions—
which has over the years come out with a number of high-level working papers,
consultation reports, and model codes of ethics, with respect to some of these
issues—threatens expulsion if its member regulatory regimes do not adhere to these
common standards. The SEC itself has entered into a number of memoranda of
understanding with various countries to encourage co-operation. Fifteen years ago,
insider trading was not necessarily illegal in many jurisdictions, including Switzerland
and others. Now, virtually every major market in the world has insider trading
prohibitions. The United States led the way in that realm. Countries adopted these
standards with a view towards being part of what they view as the international
developed-market club.
Nonetheless, despite the convergence, competition is an important element.
The City of London, for example, has thrived on competition and on setting itself
apart from, for example, the United States. After World War II, the United States
capital markets dwarfed all other markets. But, besides global economic and trade
developments, a number of unilateral steps by the U.S. over the years have increased
the ability of other folks to compete with us. The first was in the Kennedy
administration back in 1963. There was what was called the Interest Equalization
Tax, imposed on borrowing by U.S. companies and foreign companies in the U.S.
The goal was to keep U.S. capital in this country and to equalize the costs between
selling debt and equity securities. It basically backfired and resulted in a flight of
offerings to London because of the differential in yields resulting from the tax.
Likewise, the Federal Reserve had what were called “rate caps,” which placed a cap
on the interest banks could pay on bank accounts. We had a high interest rate
environment in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s. Banks responded by expanding
operations and products abroad in order to be able to offer the higher interest rates
that their customers were demanding on their money.
Now, we have Sarbanes-Oxley, which has itself, according to many people,
resulted in some companies looking to list securities abroad and foreign companies
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looking to stay out of the United States. The London Stock Exchange, for example,
is even trying to get smaller U.S. companies to list on their Alternative Investment
Market with some success. We’ve seen the amount of initial public offerings in the
United States relative to the rest of the world decline. Ten years ago, nine out of ten
dollars worldwide raised through initial public offerings were raised in the United
States. Today, nine out of ten dollars raised globally through IPOs are raised abroad,
mostly in London.
Some people are saying, or charging, that this is a race to the bottom. I’d say
not. In many cases, competition is good. And there are differences in markets
between the United States and the rest of the world. Our market is essentially halfretail, half-institutional. Abroad, it’s about 85 percent institutional and only 15
percent retail. So, should we really say that investors ought to be able to decide what
sort of regulatory regime they want to put their money into? The fear of regulatory
arbitrage—of the race to the bottom—presupposes that government knows best,
that investors cannot decide for themselves, that they’re just chumps in the game. I
think investors will continue to invest abroad, absent any sort of exchange controls
or restrictions, and that’s probably a good thing. It will help to keep us honest.
Consider our banking regulation, for example. It is a mixture of federal and state
regulation. You have the Fed, the Comptroller of the Currency, the OTS for thrifts,
and the states all competing to a certain extent over products. Much of the
innovation—a lot of new products—developed through that competition, which I
would call healthy.
Of course, regulatory competition can also be bad. Our aspiring governors,
AGs, have overlapping jurisdiction, especially with respect to securities, and we see
how that has been used—not, I think, always to the best effect. It has created
market uncertainty. We have seen in some cases what I would term “regulation by
press release”—a lack of due process in many cases. In fact, in some of these cases,
a state has been able to impose substantive regulatory requirements on international
market participants—securities firms, mutual funds, whatever they may be—even
though at the same time the market itself was working to punish the offending firms.
The miscreant firms were finding that they had huge capital outflows or were losing
business in favor of funds that were not implicated in some of these scandals.
You also see, with respect to plaintiff’s attorneys at the trial bar, a bit of
regulatory competition in a different sense. We have potentially overlapping
jurisdiction between the antitrust regulatory regime and the securities laws. In fact,
there’s a case pending before the Supreme Court, for which I hope they take cert.,
called Billing v. Credit Suisse. The plaintiffs in this case are alleging that the IPO
bubble of the late 1990s was caused by manipulation and other things, which, they
charge, implicates antitrust problems. If all of the allegations in their complaint are
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true, they also implicate the securities laws. So, there’s this overlap, and how will
that be resolved? Hopefully, the Court will take this case in hand and help resolve it.
Essentially, it is an end run around the Public Securities Litigation Reform Act,
which required high pleading standards in securities cases. It was passed by
Congress over the President’s veto in 1995.
Finally, I want to say that the SEC itself is being rather schizophrenic in
respect to competition versus regulation. In some cases, we’ve followed a good
disclosure policy: letting investors choose where they want to invest their money. In
other cases, we have imposed a one-size-fits-all type of regime. Recently, with our
mutual fund independent chair rule, our hedge fund registration rule, and our
national market system rules, we have decided for the marketplace. But, the courts
have stepped in, with help from some people on the panel here, to put us back in
our place and vacate these rules, which I think were not productive. What this has
shown—and how market participants have viewed these rules—is that, if your
neighbor’s townhouse is on fire, you had better help your neighbor put out his fire.
We have seen the Chamber of Commerce step in to challenge the mutual fund
independent chairman rule for fear that that approach might find its way eventually
into corporate America, with the SEC or others imposing that one-size-fits-all
regime. The National Venture Capital Association and private equity funds stepped
in with respect to our hedge fund rule because that same philosophy underlying the
rule, although not immediately applied, could be applied to them later. Foreigners
and others have stepped in with respect to some of the statutory provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley, to help us learn how those provisions adversely affected them.
Thankfully, we took steps to straighten that out. And with respect to some of the
ongoing problems with Sarbanes-Oxley, particularly section 404, we are taking
steps—I hope we will start next month—to make it better.
So, returning to John Donne, our 17th century firebrand poet, whose
injunction is pertinent to today’s capital markets—we need to be ever-vigilant to
safeguard market freedoms and investor choice versus government fiat. Donne’s
meditation began, “No man is an island, entire of itself,” and ended with, “therefore
never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.” Likewise, we should
realize that when government usurps market freedoms, we all lose.
Thanks.
CHAIRMAN MARJORAS: Good morning, everyone. In antitrust, mere doubledipping would be wishful thinking. In the United States alone, we have two federal
antitrust agencies. We have federal agencies that have responsibilities for
competition issues, such as when the FCC reviews telecom mergers or the DOT
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reviews airline mergers. We have 56 states, territories, and the District of Columbia,
all with their own antitrust statutes. And we have an active system of private
antitrust enforcement fostered by the prospect of treble damages. But while this
domestic web of enforcement presents a lot of challenges, it is not even, I think, our
greatest challenge today.
In 1990, there were roughly 25 competition agencies around the world, some
of which were not particularly active. After the Berlin Wall came down, nations in
Eastern Europe and other parts of the world began the arduous process of trying to
convert from state-run to market economies. Aid organizations and financial
institutions made it very clear to these countries that establishment of a competition
agency was a prerequisite to their assistance. The European Union made it clear that
countries which wished to be part of the Union must have an antitrust agency. And
the developed countries made it clear to developing countries that this was
important, too—that it would show that they were serious about moving to a market
economy.
So, now, just over 15 years later, we have more than 100 competition
agencies around the world. Russia recently passed a new competition law, and China
has been working on one for about ten years. That law had its first reading in the
National People’s Congress. Unquestionably, this movement away from statecontrolled economies is a victory. Nonetheless, we have to deal with the fact that we
have competition enforcers with little or no experience with, or faith in, markets—
few or no experienced staff, including economists. In fact, in some places, the staff
from the old State Monopoly Office now is the competition staff, with no real
supportive outside infrastructure, like a highly functioning judicial system.
Even with regards to developed nations and agencies with years of
experience, some define the level playing field as one in which a successful
multinational firm must share intellectual property or other assets with weaker local
firms—maybe often weaker because in fact they have never had to compete
before—so that all have the chance to succeed, never mind the investments that the
stronger firm has made. The greatest danger, of course, in this global regulatory
maze is that it will deter precisely the type of aggressive competitive conduct on
which markets thrive, the very competition that we enforcers are supposed to be
protecting. Antitrust is an area in which over-enforcement and promotion of
multiple divergent enforcement views and requirements can cause affirmative harm
because, in fact, businesses may have to tailor their behavior so that they pass muster
with the most restrictive of enforcers. It is no secret that even officials in developed
nations often disdain what they refer to as our form of cowboy capitalism. I was
reminded of this early in my tenure at the FTC when reading remarks by President
Jacques Chirac of France. He was talking about the passage of a new law that was to
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benefit consumers. I believe actually it was some sort of a class action statute. And
he said this: “Let us favor competition—not wild competition that destabilizes whole
fields and endangers economic sectors, but rather regulated competition.”
The McKinsey Global Institute recently completed a twelve-year study in
which its researchers set out to determine the reasons for vast economic disparities
between rich countries and poor, by studying the economic reforms of 13 nations
including the United States. And in the book explaining the results, The Power of
Productivity, by the Institute’s founding director William Lewis, Lewis dispels much of
the sacred cow wisdom on the subject. He finds that productivity provides the
answer. And the United States has such a high level of productivity, he says, because
it has such a high level of competitive intensity. But, the study concludes, the United
States was able to develop its economy without the heavy burdens of regulation that
developing countries today are saddled with as a result of the OECD nations’
exporting regulation and big government. Mr. Lewis says, “The rich countries today
have given the poor countries a curse. That curse is not globalization. It is big
government.”
To give you a live example I heard about recently: U.S. companies in a
dynamic industry proposed to merge. The Department of Justice’s Antitrust
Division engaged an investigation, which took less than two months, and cleared the
deal. But the parties also had to file a merger notification in another foreign
jurisdiction because the buyer had a subsidiary in that jurisdiction—even though that
subsidiary did not manufacture the only product that was of competitive significance,
the only product with a competitive overlap. For the product, the two companies
combined had less than ten million dollars in sales in that particular country. But the
parties had to file this notification, which they did. But the jurisdiction wanted more
time. They requested that the parties pull the filing and restart the clock, which they
did. They then received the equivalent of a second request issued by the FTC or
DOJ. The parties made a number of divestiture offers, all of which were rejected by
the jurisdiction, and after several months the deal cratered.
We and everyone else around the world will never know how that deal would
have benefited our consumers because the market in the United States for these
products was much larger. This unfortunately is not atypical today. The fact is that
U.S. and other multinational firms routinely must make merger notification filings in
a dozen or more jurisdictions even for relatively small deals. One large U.S.
company has told us that it routinely makes merger filings in countries where the
cost of the filing far exceeds the total sales and assets of the acquired entity in the
jurisdiction. So mergers provide easy examples, given their requisite regulatory
filings, but an equally if not more serious problem that the proliferation of

422

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 8

competition regimes may be producing is monopolization. Just ask Microsoft about
its experience in dealing with divergences between the United States and Europe and
Korea, and Microsoft is not the only one.
What are we doing about this? How are we preventing a complete disaster?
Well, the FTC and the Antitrust Division have an agreement through which we
allocate matters on the civil side of antitrust. It works well most of the time, but
when it does not it can be costly. There is no recent experience I can think of in
which each agency has investigated the same matter, except in the 1990s. The FTC
deadlocked two to two on whether to bring a case against Microsoft. Then the DOJ
took it up. And the rest is history, of course. In addition, we and the Antitrust
Division cooperate with the states. We have a 1998 protocol for coordination in
merger investigations, and a federal-state working group that meets either by
telephone or in person on a monthly basis to talk about issues and sort out any
differences. This process works very well, I would say, most of the time. But again,
consider the Microsoft case. The federal government ultimately settled that case. Ten
states and the District of Columbia decided the settlement was not, in their view,
adequate, went forward, continued in the district court at great cost, and ultimately
lost on the remedy that they wanted.
As for private enforcement, the FTC and DOJ have been active before the
Supreme Court to ensure that development of antitrust law does not take a wrong
turn as a result of private antitrust litigation. This advocacy’s been very important
and effective, but there is no denying the fact that most companies will settle large
private class action antitrust lawsuits rather than face a jury with the prospect of
treble damages. At the FTC, we have had a class action project in which we at times
examined proposed antitrust class action settlements and filed the occasional amicus
brief to let the judge know that we think the lawyers are making out quite nicely,
while consumers are getting absolutely nothing.
In the international arena, we have built very strong relationships with our
major trading partners like Japan and Europe, Canada, Australia. Our staff,
particularly with the Europeans, works on a daily basis on overlapping antitrust
matters, mostly in the merger arena, and in the cartel arena for the Justice
Department. We have been successful in avoiding divergences in that realm. The
last major divergence we had was in 2001 in the GE-Honeywell matter. We also
work directly with countries like India and China in the process of developing their
competition laws, and we have had extensive discussions with these and other
countries. We have a very active technical assistance program. In the last two years
the FTC and the Antitrust Division have worked with competition agencies in 20
developing countries, including Vietnam, where the President has been this week, to
explain how we do things in the United States. This is not easy, but it is very
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important. And we work, of course, with multilateral organizations, including one
that the two antitrust agencies helped start in 2001 called the International
Competition Network. The ICN started with 16 agencies and it now has 99 member
agencies. We will see who is going to be number 100. We work on a project basis—
no bureaucracy, no secretariat. We just work within our agencies with some help
from the outside, and build practices which officials can then implement back in
their countries. That has really started to demonstrate success, particularly in the
area of merger process, where many countries have taken the best practice principles
back to their own countries and literally changed the way they are doing merger
process. So we are making some progress there.
The problem, of course, is that you can never know the extent to which the
global maze is chilling the aggressive competitive conduct that economies really need
to thrive. I will leave you with two suggestions about how we can get help from the
private community in this country. First, the line of complainants at the door of the
European Commission is loaded with U.S. firms who are there to complain about
the practices of U.S. firms that have significant market shares.
They
know
that the EC’s rules require it to open an investigation whenever a complaint is
lodged. And, we are told, they believe that the EC will be more sympathetic to
complaints from competitors. Some of those same companies do not bother to
come into the FTC or to the DOJ, even though they are U.S. companies, apparently
because, while we welcome all antitrust complaints—we would like to hear about
them—we do show a healthy skepticism toward complaints about competitors, given
the clear incentives. So, while forum shopping is a fact of life, I wonder whether it is
a wise move in the long run for U.S. companies to encourage the adoption of a more
regulatory approach toward successful firms.
Second, I’m detecting some of the “I’m okay, you’re okay” school of dealing
with other jurisdictions on these issues is starting to creep into even our own
antitrust bar, when dealing with other jurisdictions. When lawyers are representing
clients, of course, they have to do this to the best of their ability. But suggestions
that standing up for the U.S. system when you are in policy discussions and
conferences abroad makes you an ugly American are complete nonsense, and all
players would do well in the business community to support a system that holds
companies to the rules but that does not preach undue intervention.
Thank you very much.
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HON. MR. SCALIA: Judge Smith, thank you for the introduction. It’s a pleasure
to be here today.
We can consider this the “Federalism Stinks” panel. We do these
occasionally at the Federalist Society, just to confirm that we’re prepared to follow
the truth wherever it may lead. These panels tend to include people like me, private
practitioners who spend a lot of time advising companies how to achieve legal
compliance nationwide, which can be an increasingly aggravating project but also
(and it’s some consolation) can be good for revenues.
I’ll speak, then, from the perspective, first, of a labor and employment lawyer
currently in private practice representing companies in these circumstances, and,
second, someone who’s held a federal prosecutorial position and thought about
these issues a bit in that capacity. Third, but a distant third, I’ll speak from the
perspective of someone who’s been involved in some recent SEC regulatory matters,
including a couple that Commissioner Atkins adverted to.
In the labor and employment area particularly, the challenge confronting
companies is not merely double-dipping, it’s a matter of managing legal compliance
and risk on three fronts: federal regulation, state regulation, and private litigation. I
should say, by the way, that the problem we’re talking about here—which within
U.S. borders is closely related to questions of preemption—is an area where labor
and employment law has a somewhat rich history, if not an altogether coherent
philosophy. ERISA is highly preemptive of state and local regulation, although
within ERISA preemption jurisprudence there is some inconsistency and lack of
clarity. The National Labor Relations Act is another bedrock law in the labor and
employment area that is highly preemptive of state and local law. Yet, there are
other very important labor and employment laws at the federal level that are not
preemptive. The result is a system in which there is some measure of unclarity as to
the degree to which ERISA and the NLRA preempt state and local law, and also—
and to a greater degree—a desire for the greater clarity and ease of ascertaining legal
obligations that would exist if other federal employment laws also preempted state
and local regulation.
The challenges people representing corporations see in this area, I think,
come from two principal sources. One is private litigation under the state wage-hour
laws, which for a long time were quiescent. Until recently there was very little state
wage-hour litigation; litigation in the area was overwhelming under the federal law.
But anybody following California litigation trends knows, for example, that there are
now hundreds of wage-hour cases filed in California per year, some of them with
enormous stakes. According to reports, one company, Farmers, paid approximately
200 million dollars in a state wage-hour case. Smith Barney reportedly paid about
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100 million dollars. There have been other cases of similar magnitude. These cases
typically involve the question whether the employer properly classified its
employees—assistant managers, for example—as exempt from the overtime
requirements. They weren’t paid overtime, and the jury finds that they should have
been. The result is overtime liability going back a couple of years at least. This is an
area, by the way, where you would not consider there to be a particularly strong local
interest: with respect to the minimum wage, you can expect the appropriate wage to
vary by locale and therefore can understand a regime where legal obligations may not
be uniform nationally. But whether an assistant manager is an exempt executive or
an administrative employee we would not regard as a matter of peculiarly local
concern that could not yield to a common, national definition.
The consequences of this state law wage-hour litigation are, first, sizable
monetary payments and, second, as I’ve suggested, great difficulty administering
nationwide compensation plans. Under ERISA, that’s cause for preemption—one
of the principal grounds for ERISA preemption is employers’ need to uniformly,
nationally administer their benefit plans. But there’s not, at this point, the same
ability to uniformly nationally administer monetary compensation plans.
A second source of pressure that we see in the area of uniform national
employment policies is unions’ increasing resort to state and local legislatures to
achieve results that they’re not able to achieve at the federal level. Federal labor law
has essentially been legislatively static for decades now. Attempts to amend the
National Labor Relations Act have failed both when advanced by employers and
also, and more prominently, when advanced by labor unions. As a consequence we
see labor unions going more frequently to other legislative bodies to advance their
agenda.
I’ll mention two examples. First is the so-called anti-Wal-Mart law that
Maryland enacted earlier this year, forcing Wal-Mart to spend more on employee
health benefits. That was a law that my firm was involved in challenging, and that
was invalidated on ERISA preemption grounds earlier this year by Judge Motz of the
District Court for Maryland. The case is now on appeal in the Fourth Circuit.
[Editor’s note: After the date of this presentation, Judge Motz’s decision was
affirmed by the Fourth Circuit.] There are as many as 30 similar laws that have been
introduced in other state legislatures, and at least two that have been enacted locally
by counties or municipalities. A second prominent example of unions’ recourse to
state and local legislative bodies is laws enacted by California and other states that
prohibit state contractors from using revenues derived from state contracts for
purposes of opposing union organizing. These laws are being challenged on NLRA
preemption grounds; the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed a ruling that the California
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law was preempted, but then—en banc and by a fairly lopsided margin—held that the
law was not preempted. Supreme Court review in this or a subsequent, similar case
is certainly possible.
This, then, is how the problem is perceived by regulated entities in the labor
and employment area and how it’s manifesting itself to some extent in litigation
today. Let me turn to the question of how to address the challenges presented by
what this panel is calling regulatory double- or triple-dipping. I’m not going to
attempt to propose a legislative solution, for two reasons. First, as I said, federal
labor and employment law is fairly static and it’s quite hard to make any significant
changes—even through regulation, let alone through legislation. Second, the last
panelist today is Dr. Greve, and I understand he’s going to propose an overarching
uniform resolution of the difficulties we’re discussing, a solution that, at the same
time, is consistent with the values that are important to members of the Federalist
Society. So, out of respect, I will leave it to Dr. Greve to unveil a global resolution,
and for my part will offer some thoughts on how federal regulators can go about
their business with some of these difficulties in mind.
First, they can simply aim to bring clarity to their own programs. That was
one of the reasons that, at the Solicitor’s Office in the Labor Department, we
thought the Department’s program of filing amicus briefs on important unsettled legal
issues was valuable; ideally, it reduces administrative burdens by making the law
more clear and uniform. Secretary Chao has similarly placed emphasis on what she
calls “compliance assistance” intended to bring greater clarity to departmental
positions and programs.
Second, federal litigators and regulators can stop and ask themselves, “Where
are our resources truly needed?” When I was at the Labor Department, I thought
that some of the smaller wage-hour cases—involving quite low-paid employees, and
not necessarily large numbers of them—were often the most deserving of our
attention because cases involving highly paid employees were more likely to attract
capable plaintiffs’ attorneys in light of the potentially substantial monetary returns
involved. It seemed sensible to me to focus our resources on legal violations that we
thought others might not address, and that influenced our choice of cases to pursue.
Federal regulators and prosecutors, then, should deploy their resources
mindful of what other resources there are that may also be brought to bear. A
related point for federal prosecutors, don’t pile on. You can garner favorable
publicity by bringing a lawsuit or charges against a widely vilified company or
individual that already is subject to other litigation and prosecution. But at some
point, if other enforcement authorities and private litigation appear to be providing
remedies to those have been wronged and ensuring appropriate punishment, then
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the better use of resources is to focus efforts elsewhere—recognizing that this
sometimes can be a hard decision to make and to defend to those who exercise
political oversight.
Put differently, it is counterproductive when regulators view themselves as
competing with one another. The fact that somebody else got there first is not a
reason that you ought to get there too; on the contrary, in a federal system it’s a sign
of function rather than dysfunction that once one regulator is involved, another
occasionally concludes, “The system’s working, I don’t have any need to go there as
well.” When now-former SEC Chairman William Donaldson came into office, the
prevailing wisdom was that the SEC had been embarrassed by Eliot Spitzer’s
aggressive enforcement in the mutual fund area, among others. And the perception
was that Chairman Donaldson felt that part of his mandate was to “redeem” the
SEC’s reputation by regulating aggressively in areas where Spitzer had been active.
Now, there may have been some failures there; there may have been gaps in the
SEC’s program to be filled and addressed. But what’s become clear is that Chairman
Donaldson over-reached: he overstepped the bounds of his authority and, I think to
some extent, brought embarrassment on the agency by pushing through the new
mutual fund rule and hedge fund regulation that were both thrown out by the D.C.
Circuit. The mutual fund regulation was thrown out twice, as Commissioner Atkins
knows—he was an extremely articulate dissenter in both of those rulemakings. But
my point, again, is that if a particular form of misconduct is being vigorously
prosecuted by another authority, in a federal system that’s not necessarily a sign of
dysfunction at all (assuming that other authority is acting within the bounds of its
own legal mandate). The dysfunction, instead, can be in believing that the public
interest is served by a competition among regulators to address a matter already
being pursued by another regulatory authority.
The last thing I’ll suggest that government actors can do to minimize the
regulatory triple-dipping we’ve been discussing is, at least in some areas, to defer to
private arbitration. When I was at the Labor Department, I issued a memorandum
to the lawyers in the Solicitor’s Office instructing them to defer to the arbitration
process in certain instances where private individuals had entered arbitration
agreements. The Supreme Court has ruled that the EEOC, the Labor Department,
and other employment agencies can bring suit in federal court for the benefit of an
individual even when the individual has signed a binding arbitration agreement. The
fact that the government can do this, however, doesn’t mean that it always should. As
the Supreme Court has said elsewhere, federal policy favors arbitration, and deferring
to legitimate binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements furthers that policy, reduces
the burden on the federal courts, often can result in a more expeditious resolution of
employment disputes, and of course respects private contractual commitments. So,
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the Labor Department has a program—on paper, at least—for deferring to
arbitration in at least some circumstances. It’s a policy the EEOC and other agencies
should consider as well.
I’ll conclude with a couple thoughts on what can be done by those in the
private sector who are concerned about the issue we’ve been discussing. The Labor
and Employment Practice Group of the Federalist Society had a panel last year
where one of our speakers, Professor Amy Wax of the University of Pennsylvania
Law School, discussed the literature on the degree to which employers take account
of state employment laws in deciding where to locate their operations. There’s a lot
of sort of anecdotal surmise that aggressive state regulation of the employment
relationship will cause corporations to flee the state and locate elsewhere. But Amy
found very little empirical examination of this purported phenomenon. This is
something that it would be valuable to have those in the academy take a look at, and
research that the private sector might be interested in sponsoring to a degree. If it is
true, as one can reasonably expect, that excessive state regulation in the labor and
employment area will drive out business, cost jobs, raise prices for consumers,
deplete available services to residents, and the like, then these are things state
legislators ought to know and consider when deciding how to vote on the laws put
before them.
In addition to research of this nature, it would be useful to have a ranking of
states according to the degree of regulation—worst-to-best states to locate your
business, based on the labor and employment regulatory environment. I’m speaking
specifically of labor and employment law, but of course the idea can be transposed to
other areas as well. This is something that companies could use in making their
decisions, and it’s something that could discipline states as they consider what
further laws to enact or—we should never forget—to repeal. That, at least, is one
sort of market-based idea to address the difficulties in regulation we’re discussing
today.
Thank you.
DR. GREVE: In some areas, the multiplication of regulatory regimes that hit a
single firm result from the increased scale and scope of economic production. I
think international antitrust is an example of that. You really don’t want one
worldwide regulator. At the same time, firms operate in many markets, and the price
effects rattle all over the place. At the end of the day, if you want to sort this out,
you’ll have to talk to the Europeans. If you don’t think that’s a problem, you’ve
never met a European.
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Here at home, I think the opportunity for regulatory double-, triple-, or
quadruple-dipping, the multiplication of regulatory agencies and access points, is a
deliberate result of a political program. That program is commonly known as the
New Deal. Prior to the New Deal, you had a regime of exclusive federal jurisdiction
and exclusive state jurisdiction. Moreover, that regime made it very clear which of
the individual states had authority over any given transaction or firm, under what
circumstances. In those circumstances, regulatory double-dipping (or whatever you
want to call it) was relatively rare.
The New Deal had three interlocking commitments that cut against that
exclusive regime. First, the New Deal’s overriding program was a cartel at every
level—not just the national level but also in the states. The classic case in that area is
Parker v. Brown. Second, a political program of cartels at every level demands
concurrent state and federal powers over the entire range of economic transactions.
Otherwise, regulated firms will sort themselves into one or the other regime. That’s
the last thing you want. Third, the New Deal ensured that the strictest regulator will
always dominate the universe. So, cartels at every level—concurrent powers
everywhere—make sure the strictest regulator always wins. Welcome to Felix
Frankfurter’s constitution. That is the system we have. That is the system we live
with.
A system that is consciously made and designed can be consciously unmade
and undesigned. The New York Times accuses me of wanting to overrule the New
Deal. Actually, that is not my program. I want to undermine the New Deal by
means of underhanded quasi-constitutional doctrines, and I yield to no one in my
endorsement of such doctrines. There is any number of them, but the one I want to
talk about today is preemption doctrine, which I think is actually quite instructive.
Prior to the New Deal, the Supreme Court’s doctrine was what we now call “field
preemption.” As soon as Congress spoke at all, regardless of intent, states were
completely blocked from that area. When the New Deal greatly expanded the scope
of the Commerce Clause, the New Dealers asked themselves: “What does that leave
of the states? Nothing at all.” So, the New Deal tried to compensate for the
expansion of the Commerce Clause by throttling back on the preemptive effect of
federal statutes. That is called the “presumption against preemption.” It is the core
of preemption doctrine to this day.
The origin of that doctrine is a case called Rice v. Santa Fe, which said that the
historic police powers of the states are not supposed to be preempted unless
Congress has clearly indicated its intent to do so. Out of the case came the modern
preemption doctrines. But it would be useful if people who cite Rice v. Santa Fe
actually read it on occasion. I have done so, and it turns out it's not a preemption
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case all. The statute at issue in that case was the Federal Warehouse Act (as in grain
warehouses), which had to be regulated because they were a bottleneck between
farms and food processors. They had been regulated at the state level. In 1931,
Congress passed the Warehouse Act and said, “Dear warehouse operator, if you
want a federal license, you can have one on the following conditions,” and, in that
case, state regulation ends; federal regulation is exclusive. With respect to stateregulated warehouses, we don’t preempt anything at all. The Act sought to establish
a dual warehousing system, like the dual banking system we now have. The federal
law operated only at the operator’s own choice. Nothing at all was preempted.
Look at what the Supreme Court did to that statute in this case: despite the fact that
the statute said that the federal license would be exclusive, the Court ruled that the
states can in some areas still regulate federally licensed operators. Felix Frankfurter,
in dissent, would have granted states an even broader scope. His concern was not
that Congress was trampling on the states; obviously, it wasn’t. His concern was that
the federal regulators had not created a rate-making regime—which is what he really
wanted. A regulatory statute without rate-making can’t be a real serious federal
regime, and therefore the states had to be allowed to operate on top of the federal
statute, even though it said it was exclusive. In short, Rice was a desperate attempt to
squeeze a perfectly fine pre-New Deal statute into a curious powers framework.
If that’s not the preemption doctrine you want—and I think it isn’t—then
what is it? I’ll give you a few guideposts to what I think preemption law ought to
look like, and then apply it to two cases. The first principle you want to start with is
an anti-circumvention principle. If the direct offense of the statute is prohibited,
states shouldn’t be allowed to evade and regulate around it. Second, you want to
construe preemption doctrine consistent with the dormant Commerce Clause, or
rather with the federalism risks against which the dormant Commerce Clause was
supposed to guard. There are three of them. The first is balkanization of the
economy. The second is the risk of state discrimination against out-of-state
commerce. And the third is the states’ tendency to export the costs of their regimes.
If any of those risks are present, I think you ought to read the statute to imply
preemption. And if none of these risks are present, you want to cut the states some
slack. I think that's the good sense of this presumption against preemption in
historic state powers areas.
I can’t go into the details here, but I’ll give you two quick examples of how I
think this shakes out. My first example is antitrust. If you look at cases dealing with
preemption in that area, the courts always say, “Well, the Sherman Act is supposed
to be supplemental to state regulation.” That’s kind of true. But what the courts
meant in the ‘20s when the supplemental language came up was that the Sherman
Act regulates interstate conspiracies and the states regulate conspiracies with only instate effects. (How do I know that? Well, that's what the Sherman Act says.) What
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“supplemental” meant after the New Deal is that the states regulate the full range of
private commerce and the feds regulate the full range of private conduct. At the end
of the day, the feds noodle around with the local taxicab commission and the state of
West Virginia regulates Microsoft. Isn’t that a great regime?
Nothing in the statute commands that kind of outcome. If you take seriously
the preemption regime of the federalism analysis I’ve sketched, it turns out Parker v.
Brown is wrong—and that, I think, is the right result. It also turns out that California
v. ARC is wrongly decided—and I think that’s also true. My second example is
securities regulation. The way I read the Securities Act—and I don’t care what the
Enforcement Division says—is that there’s already plenty of authority to preempt
Eliot Spitzer. Anything that interferes with the national markets—with functioning
national capital markets—ought to be preempted, I think, because otherwise the
balkanization and cost exploitation risks are just too serious.
I could go on at length, but I won’t. I just will end on this note. Doubledipping in regulatory conflicts in the United States is not a force of nature. It is a
deliberate creation, and I think the obstacles to getting rid or curbing it are not at all
legal; they’re political. So, we have an Antitrust Modernization Commission which is
supposed to study what’s wrong with antitrust. The preemption issue is the big
elephant in their lavish quarters, and they’re just ignoring it. Similarly the SEC—and
Paul Atkins knows much, much more about this than I do—in the early 1990s
looked at the preemption of state Blue Sky laws. Richard Breeden thought that he
had the authority to preempt those laws but then didn’t do it. The SEC needlessly
waited around until Congress mercifully got around to preempting the states as least
in some respects.
My strong suspicion is that there are more things that federal agencies can
and ought to preempt now. My advice is to say, once there’s a regulatory crisis and
Eliot Spitzer is on the warpath, it’s too late. Under those circumstances, it’s really
hard to do. You really have to lay the groundwork for preemptive moves when
there’s a little quiet and nobody notices. But when there’s quiet, by all means go
ahead and do it.
Thank you.

